Ordinatio 3, distinction 26, the single question: “Is hope a theological virtue distinct from faith and charity?”

1 Concerning the twenty-sixth distinction I ask whether hope is a theological virtue distinct from faith and charity.

2 For the negative:

No passion is a virtue, according to Ethics II [5, 1105b28–29], and hope is a passion. Therefore, etc.

3 No theological virtue expresses a mean between two evils, whereas hope does express such a mean. Therefore, hope is not a theological virtue. – Proof of the major premise: In any sphere in which there is a mean between two evils, there can be excess and deficiency. But there can’t be excess when it comes to aiming at God, as is obvious in the case of the other theological virtues: a person can’t believe God too much or love him too much. Proof of the minor premise: hope expresses a mean between the two evils of presumption and despair; therefore, etc.

4 Moreover, a theological virtue is present in us only because God immediately infuses it in us, whereas it is possible, without any such infusion, to have hope concerning any of the things that the virtue of hope is commonly held to deal with. Proof: through acquired hope we can hope for something promised by a truthful human being; there is all the more reason, then, that through acquired hope we can hope for something promised by God, who is supremely truthful.

5 Furthermore, two items that are perfectible in relation to numerically one object are sufficiently perfected by two perfections. Now there are only two powers in the soul that are perfectible in relation to an uncreated object: the intellect and the will. Therefore, etc. So, just as the intellect is sufficiently perfected by one habit in relation to this object, which is faith, so too the will is sufficiently perfected by one habit in relation to that object, which is charity. Thus, there are only two theological habits.

6 Now suppose someone said that there are three parts of the image, and so three
perfection habits are required, corresponding to these three parts. One could object that two of
the parts of the image belong to intellect and only one of them belongs to the will. So if this
distinction were the basis for requiring three habits, we would posit two theological habits in
the intellect and only one in the will. That’s obviously false, since according to certain
authorities, hope is not considered an intellectual virtue or habit.

7 On the contrary:

1 Corinthians 13[:13] says, “But now abide these three: faith, hope, and charity.”
Therefore, hope is a habit distinct from faith and charity.

[I. Various possible answers
   A. The first approach
      1. Exposition]

8 The authoritative passage just cited [n. 7] from the Apostle is foundational for this
question, and the saints have relied on it in their discussions of this material.

9 There was, however, one person who had no respect for this authority and relied
instead on natural reason. And because “plurality should be avoided wherever there is no need
to affirm it,” and in this case there appears to be need to affirm a third theological virtue distinct
from faith and charity, he denied that hope is a distinct virtue.

10 Now the minor premise of this argument can (according to them) be proved as follows:
One and the same will can be sufficiently disposed to ordinate willing and ordinate
willing-against. (Proof: willing-against x can be ordinate only if willing the opposite of x is
ordinate. This is also confirmed by that passage from De anima I [5, 411a–6], “By the straight line

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1See Scotus, Lect. I d. 3 n. 448 and II d. 24 n. 27. The three parts of the image are the acts (not
merely the powers) of memory, understanding, and will.

2Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy I, meter 7, identifies hope as one of the four principal passions.
His words were frequently cited in discussions of hope.

3Herman, a student of Peter Abelard, in his Sententiae c. 1.
we judge both the straight and the curved.”) And one and the same thing is sufficiently disposed to love a present good and to desire an absent good. (This is proved by both reason and authority. By reason: it is by one and the same power that a thing tends to a terminus it has not yet reached and rests in that terminus once it has been reached – this is clearly true of heavy things. The authority is that of Augustine in the last chapter of On the Trinity IX [12.18], “The desire of the one longing becomes the love of the one enjoying.”) Therefore, if there is any habit by which the will is sufficiently disposed to an ordinate enjoying or willing of some present good, that very habit will sufficiently dispose the will to any ordinate willing that is a desire [for an absent good] as well as any ordinate willing-against with respect to an absent good. And charity is sufficient by itself to dispose the will supernaturally to love every present good that is worthy of enjoyment.

11 There is a second proof of this minor premise. Acquired friendship is sufficient for any ordinate willing with respect to what is loved: not merely the willing of desire and the willing that consists in loving a present good, but also willing-against the opposite of what is loved. And of course infused friendship does not fall short of acquired friendship in terms of how many objects it is sufficient for, for the will extends itself as widely as possible to everything that can be loved through charity. Therefore, etc.

[2. What should be said about this approach]

12 If we maintain this conclusion, we could say that hope is a sort of aggregate of two virtues, faith and charity. For the act of faith, which is expectation, includes certainty; and this certainty belongs to faith, which is in the intellect, and involves desire, which belongs to the will. And if that’s the case, meritorious desire belongs to charity, which perfects the will. Therefore, just as perfect and meritorious expectation includes certainty on the part of the intellect and desire on the part of the well-ordered will, so also hope could be said to aggregate faith and charity into a single perfect virtue. Accordingly, hope would not be identified as a third virtue in an unqualified sense, but only formally, because it aggregates two virtues, each of which by itself is a virtue in an unqualified sense, and hope is a virtue only formally, by the
formality of aggregation.4

13 On the other hand, the will can have such a desire for what is not yet possessed even without charity; moreover, the complete act of hope, as well as hope itself, can be unformed. In that condition, hope is more akin to faith than to charity. So it seems better to say that insofar as hope coincides with faith, it is not a distinct virtue, because the distinction between universal and particular does not make for formally distinct habits, as is clear in the case of all intellectual habits. Now faith has to do with something universal, since by faith I hold that everyone who is righteous at the last will be saved; hope has to do with something particular, since by hope I hold that I, being righteous at the last, will be saved. Therefore, these two are not formally distinct habits.

14 Confirmation: We do not say of those who despair that they hate [their own salvation], but that they are deceived. And for that reason they need to be brought around to a right way of thinking so that they will love or choose [their salvation], since obviously they would choose it if they believed that it is possible for them to attain it.

15 In keeping with this view, one should say that faith in all the revealed articles that concern all people and every time is true faith and is universal.

16 There is also a faith that is a more particular faith, in that a given person has faith in the revealed articles that concern him- or herself, and only in those that concern the future. This greater degree of specificity does not make for a different habit, any more than it does in other intellectual habits; rather, it is the very same habit, with a specification deriving from the object.

17 For that reason it is not identified as a third habit or third virtue. Instead, faith as it concerns just some revealed matters—namely, those that concern the future of the person believing—is called hope, even though hope [as such] encompasses both the person believing and others.5

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4Q ends this sentence with “because it aggregates two [virtues].” The remainder of the sentence continues with the reading of the critical edition, which follows A.

5Reading extendat se ad personam credentem et ad alia with Q. The critical edition has extendat se ad personam credentem et aliav, “encompasses the person believing and other [articles of faith].” On either reading, the point is clear: the view under discussion can identify as faith an intellectual habit that
Suppose someone said that futureness is a relevant difference in the object and thus distinguishes hope from the other virtues. One could argue against that as follows:

First, a universal habit and a particular habit are one and the same, as is clear in all intellectual habits. Therefore, given that the habit that concerns “Everyone who is righteous at the last will be saved” is faith, in just the same way the habit that concerns “If, I am righteous at the last, will be saved” will also be faith.

Second, if futureness is a formal aspect of the object, it will turn out that hope isn’t even a theological virtue, because it will have as its object something temporal rather than something eternal, given that a temporal characteristic would be a formal aspect of its object.

Third, if futureness requires its own habit, by parity of reasoning so does pastness. And then there wouldn’t be a single habit of faith for both past and future.

Someone who wanted to defend this first approach could reply that just as there are two powers in the soul that are apt by nature to attain God as object, namely intellect and will, and to do so by elicited acts proper to themselves, each of these two powers is also sufficiently perfected by a single habit with respect to that object. Thus, just as the intellect is sufficiently perfected with respect to that object by means of the habit that is faith, in exactly the same way the will is sufficiently disposed to that same object by the infused habit of charity. If one says all these things, everything said about hope can be retained: either that it is a third habit that includes the other two by way of aggregation or (which is more probable) that it is a certain particular faith concerning future goods that are to be attained by the person whose faith it is and is accordingly distinguished from faith taken absolutely, which concerns, without further distinction, all persons and all objects of belief for all times.

This approach is unsatisfactory because it seems to stray from the authority of the saints, who relied on what St Paul said in 1 Corinthians 13.

concerns only one person (the one who possesses faith) and only a limited range of revealed truths (those that concern the person’s own future salvation), although faith as such is not limited in either of these ways.
[B. Assessment of the second approach]

24 There is a second possible approach. One could say that it is in fact possible to hope excessively for future things (as in clear in the case of the presumptuous) as well as to hope too little (as is clear in the case of those who despair). So the “passion that is hope for a future good” requires moderation; and consequently the habit that assures such moderation, since it has as its object the eternal good that the hopeful person attains, can be a theological habit; and it is called ‘hope’ because we understand by that word a habit that moderates the passion by which someone tends to a future good that is to be attained. For any morally perfect person requires habits with respect to passions that he is apt to experience either excessively or deficiently.

25 Objections to this approach:

First, if this were the case, hope would be an acquired moral virtue, not an infused moral virtue, because a virtue that moderates passions is a moral virtue.6

26 Second, if this were the case, there would be such a thing as infused fear, but that would not be a theological virtue, since it would concern not the uncreated good but merely something bad. And a theological habit concerns the uncreated good.

[C. The third approach, which is Henry of Ghent’s.

1. Exposition]

27 According to another approach, hope is distinguished from charity, even though both perfect the same power, the will, because hope is in the irascible part and charity in the concupiscible,7 a distinction that applies not only in the sensory appetite but also in the will.

28 Four arguments are given in favor of this view:

The first argument is based on their objects. The object of the concupiscible is the desirable good; the object of the irascible is the difficult good. We call something a desirable

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7Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VIII q. 15 in corp; Thomas Aquinas, *Sent* III d. 26 q. 1 a. 2 in corp.
good when the person desiring it desires it for the sake its own advantageousness; we call an estimable or desirable good ‘difficult’ when the will desires, for the sake of that good, to overcome everything contrary to it. These two characteristics, which belong to one and the same object under different aspects of that object, are not merely goods conditionally, for the here and now; they are goods in an unqualified sense. Therefore, they are not goods merely in the way in which good is the object of the sensory appetite, which is concerned with the here-and-now good, but in the way in which good is the object of the will. Thus these two accidental characteristics distinguish the irascible and concupiscible not merely in the sensory appetite but also in the will.

29 Second, the same thing is evident on the basis of their acts. Anger is an act of the irascible part alone. And it can happen that someone is angry not just from a passion in the sensory appetite but also from a passion in the will (“Be angry, but do not will to sin,” as we read in Psalm [4:5]); therefore, this act belongs to the will, and thus the will too has an irascible part.

30 Third, the same thing is proved by attending to the relationships among the different acts. Sometimes, when the concupiscible part is at rest in contemplating something, the will becomes active in fighting against vices that hinder contemplation, and precisely by doing so it hinders contemplation. Now no single power has through itself an act that hinders itself in its own principal act. Therefore, the concupiscible power, which seeks delight, does not become active in a fight that hinders its own delight; so the power that does this is distinct from the concupiscible.

31 Fourth, the different acts that belong to the irascible part in the sensory appetite make this clear, because all these acts seem equally necessary in the will. Therefore, any reason one has for positing an irascible part in the sensory appetite is equally a reason for positing an irascible part in the will.

8Ordinarily this verse would be translated as “Be angry and do not sin.” One way Latin expresses negative commands is, as in this verse, to use the command “Do not will” or “Be unwilling” with the infinitive. Thus, the argument asks us to understand that the anger spoken of in this verse resides in the will, because the not-sinning that is the proper response to such anger is also in the will.
32 It is also said that the concupiscible is the principal power, whereas the irascible is a power of the concupiscible; and just as in the sensory appetite all the passions of the irascible arise from the passions of the concupiscible and are terminated by them, the same thing is true in the will, because in the will too the irascible is what fights on behalf of the concupiscible.

[2. Refutation]

33 Arguments against this view:

And first, against the first argument, which is based on the object [n. 28]:

There is a right way and a wrong way to understand this business about ‘the difficult good.’ So I ask what you mean by a ‘difficult good’: it is (a) an absent good, (b) not merely an absent good, but one that exceeds the capability of the very power for which it is called difficult, or (c) an estimable – in other words, desirable – good as exceeding all other goods that are contrary to it. If (a), there will be no irascible part in heaven, and consequently possession will not succeed hope, since if possession succeeds hope, it would have to be in the same faculty and power as hope, and thus its object would be the difficult good that is absent, in whatever way it might make sense to speak of a ‘difficult’ good in those circumstances. And that’s false, because in heaven no desirable good will be absent. If (b), it would follow that there is no irascible power in God, because there is no object that exceeds his capability. The consequent is false, because if, in those who have hope, hope is a habit of the irascible part, it follows that possession also belongs to the irascible; and it does not seem that we should deny that God has possession with respect to himself. If (c), then it is a mistake to identify what is ‘difficult’ as an object of hope distinct from the object of charity; for charity, of all virtues, is the most concerned with God qua estimable, because it is concerned with God qua Infinite Good ([Augustine,] De Trinitate XV[.18.32]).

34 Furthermore, this ‘estimability’ in the object can be understood either actually or aptitudinally. If we understand it aptitudinally, meaning that the object is apt by nature to be

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*See Ordinatio IV d. 49, pars 1 q. 6 [n. 24].
esteemed, this is true above all of the object of charity, since (as I have explained [n. 33]), charity is most powerfully concerned with its object qua Good Infinite in Itself. If we understand it actually, it was a mistake to accord such esteem the status of the object of capacity or power; for such actual esteem exists because the will through its own act esteeems the object. As a consequence of this actual appreciation there is then a merely passive esteem in the object. But a formal characteristic of an object of some capacity or power has to be naturally prior to the act of that capacity or power; esteem, then, cannot naturally be a characteristic of the object of a capacity or power.

35 Furthermore, the adequate act of the irascible power is to-be-angry, just as the adequate act of the intellect is to-understand. But the act of anger can’t have a difficult good as its object, no matter which of the interpretations of ‘difficult’ [n. 33] one accepts. For according to the Philosopher in Rhetoric II [2, 1378a31], “To be angry is to desire vengeance or punishment.” This desire has as its object either the punishment itself or the thing worthy of punishment, neither of which is estimable. Therefore, the irascible does not have the difficult as its object. – This argument refutes the second argument [n. 29] for the view currently under discussion, since if being angry is an act of the irascible power, we can argue on that basis that the irascible power is not distinguished from the concupiscible power on the basis of the distinction between the difficult good and the desirable good.

36 An argument against the third argument [n. 30]: Even granting that what is apt to hinder the delight of a given capacity through some positive act must be combated through some act, so that the capacity can rest in such delight, the combat need not be positive. It can be merely privative – a matter, that is, of merely evading the hindrance. After all, a vicious act does not positively combat the well-ordered delight of the concupiscible power, since such an act does not arise at the same time as the well-ordered act of the concupiscible power as a hindrance to it. Therefore, there is no need to combat that vicious act except merely privatively, that is, by evading it or seeing to it that it does not arise. And evading what is disgraceful is the responsibility of the same power that desires what is noble; so the concupiscible power is the combative power, – Furthermore, the argument relies on the claim that the concupiscible power
does not contend or combat, because such contention hinders delight\textsuperscript{10} – and yet later, in the course of developing the argument, we find the claim that the concupiscible power is defended by the irascible so that the concupiscible will not be disturbed in its delight. These two claims – (a) that a combative power hinders the concupiscible, and (b) that it preserves the concupiscible power’s delight rather than hindering it – are clearly in conflict.

37 The fourth argument, which assigns various acts to that irascible power [n. 31], is refuted on this same basis. It could also be argued that some of those acts do not belong to the irascible power, at any rate in the sensible part, which has no acts concerning what is future \textit{qua} future.

38 The additional claim made in the first argument – namely, that the concupiscible power desires a good that is desired as advantageous for the one desiring it [n. 28] – seems improbable. For we do not deny that there is a concupiscible power in God, any more than that there is supremely perfect delight; and yet he does not desire anything as advantageous for himself, since nothing other than himself is advantageous for him.

39 As far as our present purposes are concerned, we can postpone until d. 34 [nn. 48–50] the debate about whether the will has an irascible and a concupiscible power. If indeed they should be posited in the will, they would seem to be needed in order to distinguish the moral virtues that perfect the will [d. 34, n. 51], not, as this view holds [n. 27], in order to distinguish the theological virtues (hope and charity).

40 Furthermore, just as a power presupposes a capacity, so too the object [of a power] presupposes the object [of the capacity]. Therefore, the act of that power includes the act of the capacity with respect to its object, as well as something added [see nn. 90–99]. Now a power that adds something in this way is invariably nobler (as is evident in all acts that add to each other). Therefore, if the irascible is a power and the concupiscible is a capacity, an act of hope would be unqualifiedly nobler than an act of charity, which is false.

\textsuperscript{10}Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VIII q. 15 in corp.
[3. What should be said about the refutation of the third approach] 11

41 A confirmation of the first argument against Henry of Ghent, concerning “the difficult” [nn. 33–34]: given that it is true of the object of every supernatural virtue that it exceeds all objects that are contrary to it, that condition does not distinguish any one supernatural virtue from the others; and any such object is estimable, which means that the second argument collapses into the first.

42 Henry’s second argument, concerning the act of anger [n. 29], is sufficient by itself to distinguish the powers, and one doesn’t escape its force by saying that anger is a certain willing-against with respect to some obstacle [cf. n 35]. For the one who wills-against in the fullest sense – someone who knows that the obstacle cannot be overcome – is sad in the fullest sense, not angry.

43 I reply: A willing of something that is for the end is efficacious only if it follows a cognition that the end can be attained. And in just that way, a willing-against some obstacle is a willing of the absence of something that is for the end, and it is not efficacious unless it follows a cognition that this absence can be attained. Nonetheless, efficacious and non-efficacious willing do not differ in species; they differ only formally, perhaps in terms of their intensity, or with respect to the first cognition of the possibility or impossibility of attainment.

44 Against this: one who is angry does not mere will, by an efficacious volition, that the obstacle be removed; such a person wills that the one imposing the obstacle be punished. He is not satisfied when the obstacle is out of the way until the adversary is punished. This is evident in the case of non-rational animals: if whatever had been preventing a’s pleasure is removed, a is not satisfied unless it gets revenge. By contrast, if the thing hindering a had been angered by some obstacle, a was not angry; and then when that obstacle is removed, a does not proceed to get revenge (for example: crow crow, third crow). Now that assumption about the adequate act of the irascible power [n. 35] just seems to be false: fear and hope are passions in the irascible

11This section (nn. 41–88) appears in APSZB, in some of which it is marked as “Extra.” In other mss (most notably Q, which offers the most consistently defensible text of Book III) it does not appear at all. The text is disorderly and frequently obscure.
power, so not every passion of that power is anger.

45 I reply: the four standard primary passions concern what is desirable by the concupiscible power as well as the obstacle that calls for revenge: the primary passions are in the concupiscible power and all the others are in the irascible. And just as the four primary passions concern the object that is adequate for the concupiscible power – namely, the pleasurable – though apprehended under different descriptions: possessed, not possessed, present, future – so too the other four passions concern an obstacle, apprehended as requiring vengeance either now or in the future, or as not worthy of anger. Therefore, what this argument means to say about the first object is true.

46 But the premise in that argument about the adequate act is not true. For even granting that hope is a form of anger, on the grounds that it is an efficacious willing of vengeance, nonetheless the fear of not taking vengeance is not a form of anger, because it causes one to hold back from taking vengeance.

47 I reply: the fear of not taking vengeance is in effect a willing-against not taking vengeance, just as hope is a willing to take vengeance and a distress that vengeance has not yet been achieved. Say that this distress, and the distress concerning the present, is not formally anger but some other passion consequent upon anger, in the same way that fear and elation in the concupiscible power are not formally desire (concupiscere), but other passions that arise in the concupiscible power. So both powers, the irascible as well as the concupiscible, get their name not from an adequate passion but from their most important passion. This is clear in the case of fear: when something that will cause harm in the future is apprehended, the concupiscible power fears, and as a result of this distress, one is angry at whatever is imposing this harm and makes ready to fight against it, thus forestalling distress over a present harm and preserving oneself from that harm. If the irascible power is afraid to fight against it, if it is very afraid, it does not fight against it; and then distress comes about because the harm occurs.

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12The four primary passions are sadness, joy, hope, and fear. See Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate* q. 26 a. 5 in corp. and *ST* I-II q. 25 a. 4 in corp.

13The other four, derivative, passions are love, desire, hate, and aversion. See *De veritate* q. 26 a. 5.
48 In a quite similar way, the first hope can exist without the second hope, if one does not apprehend anything that would be an obstacle to the object of the first hope.

49 Observe: hope in the irascible power diminishes fear and distress in the concupiscible, whereas full-blown fear – or distress – in the irascible power increases distress in the concupiscible power. Hence, the greatest distress is that of an appetite undergoing the greatest harm in the present and lacking any hope that it will be able to banish the thing that is doing it harm.

50 The first part of that observation is perhaps true, but the second part is false; for although it may be true that the distress of an animal or appetite is greater when it is distressed in both powers, it is nonetheless the case that one distress diminishes the other,\(^\text{14}\) since they are compossible.

51 The second part arises from the first. An effect does not diminish a cause. Therefore, both parts are not false, speaking strictly with reference to the intensity of the powers. They are true of the appetite in regard to extension.

52 The argument given above [n. 36] against Henry’s third argument is not good. For just as we fight in order to have peace, the will fights against inordinate motions at a given time so that at some later time it will have leisure for contemplation in a more suitable and peaceful way. Therefore, so long as the irascible power is fighting, the delight of the concupiscible power is hindered, but what is intended is the peace to follow. So Henry does not contradict himself by saying both that the irascible hinders the concupiscible’s pleasure and that it fights in order that the concupiscible might experience pleasure in peace – meaning, later, once victory is obtained.

53 The counterargument [n. 40] to what Henry’s view says about the faculty and the power [n. 32] is not successful. Henry’s view should be expounded as follows: the concupiscible is more principal and the irascible less principal because it always concerns something that is for the sake of the end desired by the concupiscible; this is the ground on which one is said to be a capacity (meaning; more so than the other), although in fact both powers belong to the same

\(^{14}\)Reading \textit{unus minuit alium}. The critical edition has \textit{una minuit aliam}, which would have to mean that one power diminishes the other; but it is the passions, not the powers, that can vary in intensity.
On the contrary: in that case, a capacity can act only through some power, not immediately.

Moreover, not everything that has a concupiscible power can proceed to an act of the irascible power, whereas everything that has an irascible power can proceed to an act of the concupiscible power. Therefore, the irascible is nobler, according to the last argument against the view that one object adds to another object and one act to another act [n. 40].

Here I reply: wherever there is an irascible power, it is there because of the nobility of the concupiscible power whose satisfaction it principally intends; wherever there is no irascible power, nature had no need of it. Thus, that argument denied the irascible power on the grounds that the concupiscible power was in a state of satisfaction.

An argument for [Henry’s] view: in the irascible power of the sensory appetite, hope is a passion, so in the irascible power of the will, it is a virtue.

I reply: the inference is invalid. Hope is the very passion that serves as the starting-point of courage, which is in the irascible power. The virtue of hope is aimed at the act of courage, at an efficacious desire for advantage. That desire – where ‘desire’ means ‘expectation’ – is consequent upon the apprehension of the advantage as something that deserves and will receive a reward from someone; therefore, it belongs to the concupiscible power in the will. That by which the will combats something is not hope, because if it were, the object of hope would not be God, but whatever can be overcome. The habit that corresponds to the secondary passion of hope is the virtue of courage.

On the contrary: every characteristic in an object on account of which the concupiscible power is apt to recoil from the concupiscible object requires a perfection in the irascible power that strengthens the concupiscible power so that it does not recoil. Such a characteristic is a too-much-ness on the part of the object, not merely a hindering object. Therefore, a perfection in the irascible power is required because of a too-much-ness in the object, and not merely on account of an obstacle.

The major premise is denied, because the adequate object of the irascible power is that
which can avenged, and therefore such a feature is not too much.

61 On the contrary: the irascible is intrinsically such as to strengthen the concupiscible; therefore, it strengthens the concupiscible in any respect in which the concupiscible can fall short or recoil.

62 I reply: it is intrinsically such as to strengthen the concupiscible for those things that have to do with courage, such as fighting and enduring; but it does not strengthen the concupiscible as to its intrinsic degree. And so as to that shortfall which results from its recoiling from this object that is too much for it, that results from the fact that the concupiscible power is not elevated and so the object is too much for it. Therefore, the concupiscible power is elevated by a habit intrinsic to it [rather than by the irascible power] so that it is proportionate to the object.

63 On the contrary: That the concupiscible power recoils from what is harmful is a consequence of its own imperfection. For if it could do so more perfectly, it would attack the harmful thing, and in such a case an irascible power is not required.

64 I reply: however perfect the concupiscible power might be, it could recoil from the harmful thing; it would not attack, but flee from the harmful thing. Fleeing is not repelling. Therefore, etc. Yet, so long as the object retains its concupiscible characteristic, the concupiscible power would not be faced with an object that is too much for it; and it would be able to desire the object in actuality – however much an act varies in terms of more and less, it does not require a different power, just a perfection in the concupiscible power. That holds true for the difficult. What is difficult, as such, is a possible object for the concupiscible power; but in order for the capacity to be proportionate to the difficult so as to desire it perfectly (which is what it is to hope), it is made proportionate by an intrinsic habit aimed at overcoming the obstacle and it draws out the whole characteristic of the object and carries out its acts concerning the obstacle. Therefore, for whatever reason this case requires another power, etc.

65 Another response to the argument [of n. 59]: The major premise is true, speaking

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15Reading *fit proportionata* for the critical edition’s *et fiat proportionata.*
properly of recoiling; but recoiling, properly speaking, takes place only when that
characteristic\textsuperscript{16} is such that it cannot be loved. And what is difficult is not like that; indeed, it is
a particular reason why something can be loved. An obstacle is such that it cannot be loved.

66 The minor premise is false, even if “a capacity does not of itself tend perfectly toward
something that is too much for it” is true. There is a difference between not being disposed to
tending perfectly, on the one hand, and recoiling, on the other hand. Recoiling, in fact,
presupposes an elevated capacity: for example, a cognitive capacity recoils from something base
that it has seen, and therefore hates that thing.

67 Furthermore, it does not recoil from a conditional volition, but rather from an efficacious
volition; and a conditional volition and an efficacious volition belong to the same capacity.
Similarly, there is no need for a different capacity depending on whether what is presented is
possible or not.

68 Furthermore, if the irascible has to do with what is difficult, then, because nothing is
difficult for God, there is no irascible in God – which is false, because God desires vengeance
and takes vengeance.

69 Furthermore, if the irascible strengthen the concupiscible so that it does not fear, then
because fear and confidence belong to the same thing, it follows that the irascible causes the
concupiscible to have confidence. The consequent is false, both because confidence belongs
exclusively to the irascible, and because a passion in the concupiscible is not caused by the
irascible,\textsuperscript{17} but vice versa.

70 I reply: the concupiscible never fears, because fear concerns what is difficult

71 On the contrary: there is a difference between being afraid to lose something and being

\textsuperscript{16}\text{meaning: the characteristic in the object on the basis of which the concupiscible power recoils from the object}

\textsuperscript{17}\text{Reading in concupiscibili ab irascibili with P for the edition’s in irascibili a concupiscibili. The edition gets things backwards, saying that a passion in the irascible is not caused by the concupiscible, which obviously would not show that “the consequent” – that the irascible causes a passion in the concupiscible – is false. P’s reading actually does offer a claim that shows the consequent is false, and it has the additional advantage of according with what Scotus (and pretty much everyone else) thinks instead of being exactly the opposite.}
afraid to take vengeance for offenses. The former can exist without the latter. For example, suppose a wayfarer grasps that grace can be lost and is afraid of losing it, but does not grasp that the devil is then taking it away and thus does not grow angry at the devil or fear overcoming him.

72 Furthermore: from what passion of the concupiscible does anger against a future obstacle – that is, something that will take away the thing that will give delight – arise, if not from fear of losing that thing?

73 Moreover, there is a passion in the concupiscible power that follows the apprehension of a future evil, just as sorrow follows the apprehension of a present evil. What is that passion with respect to something in the future?

74 Furthermore, sorrow and joy are in the irascible, and according to you, so are hope and fear [see n. 45]. Why, then, can’t all the passions concern the pleasant as well as the difficult or the offensive?

75 I reply: flight!

76 On the contrary: flight follows both sorrow and this passion.

77 Nor is it a passion, since it is not from an object.

78 Moreover, if only the irascible fears, then the concupiscible, if it were by itself, would never recoil, because it does not recoil from the pleasant as pleasant. Instead it would cling to that thing, not as difficult, because it does not have any act directed at something as difficult, because what is difficult is not its object. Therefore, the irascible is not needed in order to strengthen the concupiscible.

79 I reply: the concupiscible recoils even though it does not fear, because what is difficult is not proportioned to it. And as for the claim that the concupiscible has no act directed at something as difficult, I concede that there is no such act by which it tends toward the difficult, but it does have such an act by which it recoils from what is difficult.

80 Moreover, here is a proof that the affection for the advantageous and the affection for justice (much like the irascible and the concupiscible) are two distinct capacities: something is not formally a capacity for a given action if possessing it is compatible with the impossibility of
performing that action – meaning, an intrinsic possibility (one has to add ‘intrinsic’ to forestall objections about impediments [cf n. 36]). But possessing the capacity or power to will the advantageous is compatible with an impossibility of willing what is just (and similarly for desire and anger). Therefore, etc.

81 Proof of the minor premise: an intellectual appetite, just as such, is a capacity for the advantageous. But intellectual appetite as such is compatible with non-freedom, because what is prior can co-exist with the opposite of what is posterior. These two things – being an appetite and being an appetite associated with such-and-such a cognitive capacity – are naturally prior to the characteristic of freedom. Furthermore, what non-freedom is compatible with, the impossibility of willing what is just is also compatible with. – A confirmation: freedom is not the basis on which the intellectual appetite in its own right desires advantageous things that have been cognized, both because if it were not free it would desire those things, and because the will naturally is maximally prone to desiring things that are maximally advantageous, but freedom moderates this proneness so that we do not will immoderately. Therefore, freedom is not the characteristic of the will on the basis of which it desires advantageous; quite the contrary, it is sometimes instead the basis on which the will draws back from the advantage.

82 All this is confirmed through Anselm, De casu diaboli 12 and 13.\textsuperscript{18} He says that a will informed [only] by the affection for the advantageous would not be able to sin, even if it immoderately willed that just things be advantageous. If that separation [of justice from the will] included a contradiction, Anselm’s counterfactual supposition would be nothing, not merely in reality but even in the intellect; nor would Anselm be able to show what would be true of a such a will that lacked freedom, because of the inherent contradiction [in his thought-experiment].

83 Similarly, the minor premise [n. 80] is proved to hold true of desire and anger, because what is the source of the appetite’s power of desire? Not from the irascible unless it is posterior [to the irascible]; therefore, the prior is compatible with the opposite of the posterior.

\textsuperscript{18}Anselm, De casu diaboli 12–16 (ed. Schmitt I: 255; trans. Williams, ). See also n. 110, below.
This argument [nn. 80–83] could be common to many. Therefore, I reply to the major premise: if by “possessing it” you mean “possessing it in reality,” that is, possessing that thing or nature, then I grant it. But the minor premise is false, and nothing is proved except that one characteristic is in and of itself sufficient for the one but not the other (which I grant). And therefore that characteristic is compatible in thought with the opposite of the thing; but both are necessarily\(^{19}\) in one thing.

Note that secondary hope\(^{20}\) is a sort of beginning of courage, since people who are well-disposed by nature to be in an intermediate state are well-disposed by nature to regulate that passion and thus well-disposed to courage. Secondary fear is a sort of preliminary stage of the vice of timidity; hence, someone naturally inclined to hope is naturally well-inclined with regard to fear; as for those naturally disinclined\(^{21}\) to hope, some are disposed toward rashness and others are disposed toward fear. Secondary hope and fear concern vengeance; they are passions of the irascible power regarding suffering, since patience is a [kind of] courage and is in the irascible.

I reply: constancy and inconstancy.

If you say, “no suffering is offensive to the sensory appetite except on account of reason’s command”– [88] on the contrary: a non-rational animal will put up with moderate distress to avoid losing something extremely pleasurable.

[II. Scotus’s reply to the question]

Therefore, my reply to the question is that hope is a single theological virtue, and it is distinct from faith and charity.

Here is a persuasive argument for this conclusion: We experience within ourselves the act of desiring that the Infinite Good be a good for us as a consequence of God’s generous bestowal of himself to us, not indeed unprompted, but on account of something he has accepted

\(^{19}\)Reading *necessario* with P for the edition’s *necessariae*.

\(^{20}\)See nn. 47–49 for the distinction between primary and secondary hope (and fear).

\(^{21}\)Reading *male natus* (PSZB) for the edition’s *natus enim*.
as ordered to that act, as on account of merits. This act is good; it is characterized by the requisite circumstances. Therefore, there can be virtue directed at that act.

91 The premise is evident if we run through the various circumstances:

“The object of the act is the Infinite Good”: The first circumstance is included in “desire,” which is an absolute willing, not of just anything, but of something absent. God *qua* perfectly possessed object is absent to a wayfarer. Therefore, willing that tends toward God under that description is, in that respect, characterized by a requisite circumstance.

92 The further words “that it be a good for us” indicate a requisite circumstance, because that Good is appropriate for the one for whom the Good is desired. Moreover, only an infinite Good fully satisfies desire.

93 The further words “as a consequence of God’s [generous bestowal of himself to us]” indicate a requisite circumstance with respect to that-from-which: that Good cannot be shared otherwise than by its own generous self-bestowal.

94 The further words “not unprompted,” etc., indicate an appropriate disposition on the agent’s part, namely, the way in which he will attain that Good, because it indicates the disposition that is appropriate, according to God’s ordering, for reaching that Good. For divine Wisdom has so ordered matters that God bestows himself perfectly only to those whom he has first accepted.

95 It is therefore clear that that act is right, because it is characterized by the requisite circumstances. Therefore, there can be a virtue that inclines someone to that act – an appetitive virtue, because this act, when performed, is the act of an appetitive power, and its circumstances are the circumstances of an act of appetite.

96 Moreover, the virtue that inclines someone to this act is a theological virtue. Proof: it has

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20 Reading *ex parte eius scilicet quomodo ad Bonum istud perveniatur* with Q. The majority of the manuscripts agree, with minor variations in word order that do not affect the meaning. The edition has *ex parte eius quo scilicet* etc.; it is not clear how to make grammatical sense of the *quo*.

21 See *Ordinatio* I d. 17 nn. 129, 149.

22 Alternatively: “the act of an appetitive virtue” (according to the suggestion of the critical edition), “an appetitive act” (PNY), “an act of appetite” (ZQ).
God as its immediate object, since the nature of the object as object is not taken away by all the things that are added to the object itself [see n. 90]. For my desiring that object for myself in such-and-such a way does not take away my desiring it as an object. Now the object of this act of desire is infinite, and so also eternal; therefore, the virtue that inclines someone to this act is a theological virtue.

If someone were to say that the notion of desire includes the absence of the desired object – and therefore a temporal characteristic on the part of the object – that seems unlikely. For hope and possession have to do with the object under the same formal characteristic, just as it is the formal characteristic of an object in virtue of which something tends toward it is the same as that in virtue of which something rests in it. But there is a difference: the object is approached in different ways. An absent object, approached imperfectly, is desired; a present object, approached perfectly, is loved. Thus, in natural objects, fire that has approached closely causes intense heat, whereas a distant fire, one not approached so closely, causes a feeble heat; but that doesn’t mean that a distant fire is less active than a nearby fire. In the same way, the sun causes a direct ray and a reflected ray, depending on whether it is more or less distant.

One can derive from these considerations an argument relevant to our present purposes: just as in efficient causes something is that is not relevant in its own right to the nature of the efficient causality makes no difference to the character of the effect, so too in final causes something that makes no difference to the character of what serves as the end makes no difference to the character of the end. The characteristics “being present” and “being absent” are like this. Therefore, they do not make any difference to the formal character of the object.

Confirmation: such absence or presence obtains only by means of an act of intellect. What is seen intuitively is present to the will as a possible object of love. What is seen dimly is present to the will as a possible object of desire. But these differences in the way the object can be present make no difference to the formal character of the object. Therefore, etc.

\[^{25}\text{in aenigmate, an allusion to 1 Cor. 13:12: “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then, face to face.”}\]
And if someone were to say that “desiring the good for myself” makes a difference to
the formal character of the object because it converts an intrinsic good into a useful good, that’s
false, because the condition or circumstance “for whom” is not an intrinsic condition of the
object. Indeed, such a condition can be added to the object while the formal character of the
object remains exactly the same, as is clear in the case of faith: in believing that God is the savior
who gives happiness to all who are good I do not have a different object formally from the God
about whom I believe that he is three and one and all the other articles. Rather, all I am doing in
adding [that God is the savior] is relating the eternal to something temporal, and this relation
involves only a relation of reason. In the same way, in the matter at issue “desiring for myself”
involves only a relation of the will; that is the relation I am discussing now. You see, every
faculty that is capable of relating one thing to another can compare its object to something else
and cause a relation of reason in that thing as compared. That relation of reason is not in the
thing itself as a feature that really belongs to it; it characterizes the thing only as a result of the
act of the faculty making the comparison. Thus, just as reason, by comparing its object, can
cause a relation of reason in it, so too the will, by comparing its object, can cause in it a relation
that can be called a “relation of appetite.” Now such a relation is caused in a usable object by an
act of use, when the will uses something; and such a relation can be said to be caused in God by
an act of the will when I will that this object, infinite in itself, be a good for me. For the
appetite compares that Good to something – to itself – in a comparison that is not in the object
as a feature that really belongs to it.

Suppose someone were to object, “Then the will that hopes is bad, because it is using
what ought to be enjoyed, by referring it to something else.” I reply, not every comparison that
the will makes of one object to another is the kind of comparison that counts as use. Use is only
in cases in which one thing is compared to another as a lesser good ordered to some other thing,
a greater good, which is to be attained by means of the lesser good. That’s not what’s going on
here. Instead, the will is comparing God in his abundance to a lesser good as what is to be made

26“faculty that is capable of relating one thing to another” translates vis collativa.
27Reading in se with most of the manuscripts. The critical edition has in eo.
perfect in him. This is the comparison of generosity about which Avicenna speaks in the sixth book of his *Metaphysics*.\(^{28}\)

102 Suppose someone were to object that having the Uncreated Good as an object is not sufficient for something’s being a theological virtue, because if it were, acquired faith and acquired charity would be theological virtues (for they concern the same object, under the same aspect, as infused faith and infused charity). I reply: there are three criteria that must be met for something to be a theological virtue.\(^{29}\) The first of these is that it concerns God as its primary object; the second is that it has as its rule the first rule of the virtues or the First Truth, namely, the first rule of its own human actions, but not an acquired rule; the third is that it is infused immediately by God as efficient cause. These are distinct; one is a feature of the object, another of the rule, and another of the efficient cause. Given that all three are required for something to be a theological virtue, it is clear that acquired faith and acquired charity are not theological virtues, since they fail to meet the third criterion. By parity of reasoning, neither is acquired hope. If the first criterion by itself were sufficient, or the first along with the second, then acquired hope could be regarded as a theological virtue in that it concerns God immediately as its object, because it desires God for the one hoping. (Even if it does not hope for God to be in the one hoping, it does nonetheless hope for – that is, desire – God, and not some other thing, for the one hoping.) But if the second criterion must also be met in order for it to be a theological virtue, then those who possess acquired hope lean immediately on the First Truth as the first rule of human acts or of our acts. For they do not desire God because acquired prudence dictates that God ought to be desired, but because the First Truth, supernaturally known, reveals that God ought to be desired – and that is the first rule of our acts.

103 And if someone were to object that with respect to acquired hope, acquired faith is the

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\(^{28}\)Avicenna, *Metaph* VI c. 5 (II 342-343): “Now the word ‘generosity’ . . . from its first imposition in every language is a giver who grants to another outside himself a gift that is not a repayment. . . . One who gives to another a perfection in his substance or his parts, in such a way as to receive no repayment in any way, is generous.”

\(^{29}\)The edition follows A alone in reading “a true theological virtue or the First Truth.” The criteria that follow are clearly not criteria for something’s being the First Truth.
rule, and not the First Truth, supernaturally known, one could reply that acquired faith is not the first rule in itself; and if it is not the first rule in itself, it does nonetheless relate to the first rule. And thus every virtue that has it as its first rule does not have natural prudence as its rule, but the First Truth – if not qua habit, then at any rate qua object regulating the habit.

104 And if these two criteria are not sufficient, it follows that one has to say that theology itself is not a theological habit: for there can be theology that is not immediately infused by God but instead acquired, not only in terms of actual and habitual assent (which is acquired faith) but also in terms of the apprehension that someone has as a result of teaching. And if that were the case, the scope of theological habit would have to be severely restricted.

105 If the first two criteria (concerning the object and the rule) are not sufficient without the third, which concerns the efficient cause, then one would have to concede that although hope meets the first two criteria for being a theological virtue and to that extent the answer to the question at issue here is “yes,” it counts as a theological virtue in the fullest sense by meeting the third condition, that is, by being apt to be infused immediately by God. If it is not infused, its character as a theological virtue is not as fully realized as it is apt to be by being infused. For because the highest portion of reason is directly subject to God, it is not brought to its most perfect condition by any created agent, but instead immediately by God. Now a habit that is apt to have God immediately as its object, and to rely immediately on God is its first rule, is apt to perfect the first and highest part of reason. Therefore, although an acquired30 habit can be possessed by the highest part of reason, such a habit will not bring it to its most perfect condition.31 And consequently, we should answer our present question along the lines of what was said earlier about faith – that even if there is such a thing as acquired faith, along with acquired faith one must necessarily posit another, infused, faith (even if the necessity of this

30Reading *acquisitus* with the majority of manuscripts. The critical edition follows A in reading *aliquis*, “a certain” (or simply “a”).

31Literally: “Therefore, although an acquired habit can be possessed, yet not a supremely perfect one.”
infused faith cannot be proved by natural reason).\textsuperscript{32} And just as, in the case of faith, it counts as
a theological virtue because of its object, its rule, and its aptitude for being infused (all of these
following from the fact that it belongs to the higher portion), the same argument holds for the
present question, even though there can be such a thing as acquired hope (just as there can also
be acquired faith).

So we have the first conclusion in our answer to the question: there can be a theological
virtue with respect to the act of hoping. To this I add that that virtue cannot be either faith or
charity; therefore, it is a third virtue, distinct from them.

Proof of the minor premise:

As for faith: every act of faith is an act of believing, and no act of desiring is an act of
believing.

As for charity, the proof is as follows: charity is the highest affective virtue, and
consequently it is the highest habitual love. Now friendship-love is unqualifiedly more perfect
than desire-love. Therefore, charity inclines unqualifiedly to loving with friendship-love. But
desiring that the Infinite Good be my good is not an act of friendship. Nor is it a supremely
noble act, because that object has nobler being in itself than in relation to anything other than
itself. Therefore, the act of desire that our earlier conclusion involves is not a supremely noble
theological act. Therefore, etc.

A second proof concerning charity: without such desire there can be a supremely
intense, a weak, and an intermediate act of charity. That there can be a weak act of charity is
evident, since I can will that God be good in himself without desiring God for myself. In a
similar way, it is evident that there can be an intermediate act of charity. A proof that there can
be a supreme act of charity: God supremely loves himself, because he is supremely happy in
himself, and yet this does not include God’s willing that he be a good for any other lover; nor
must a freely acting power necessarily act up to the limit of its capability. – All three
possibilities are proved as follows: it is not necessary for the will to have two acts in itself; an act

\textsuperscript{32}Lectura III d. 23 nn. 48–51, 56–57.
of loving God in himself and an act of desiring God for the sake of the one loving God are two
different acts; therefore, one can exist without the other.

110 A third proof: according to Anselm, two affections are identified in the will, the
affection for justice and the affection for the advantageous. He discusses them at length in *De
casu diaboli* 14 and *De concordia* 19. The affection for justice is nobler than the affection for the
advantageous, and that is true not only of the acquired and infused affection for justice but also
of the innate affection for justice, which is inborn freedom, in accordance with which one can
will a good not ordered to oneself. In accordance with the affection for the advantageous, by
contrast, one can will only in order to oneself. The will would have this affection if it were
strictly an intellectual appetite following intellectual cognition in just the same way that the
sensory appetite follows sensory cognition. From this I mean to conclude only that, because
loving something in itself is a freer and more generous act than desiring something for oneself,
and more suited to the will insofar as it has the affection for justice (at any rate, the innate
affection for justice), whereas the other act is suited to the will insofar as it has the affection for
the advantageous, it follows that just as these affections are distinct in the will, so too the habits
that incline to those acts are distinct in the will. I therefore say that charity perfects the will
insofar as it is disposed by the affection for justice, and hope perfects the will insofar as it is
disposed by the affection for the advantageous, and thus they are distinct virtues not merely on
the basis of their acts (which are loving and desiring) but also on the basis of their subjects,
which are the will insofar as it has the affection for justice and the will insofar as it has the
affection for the advantageous.

111 There are not distinguished on the basis of their objects, the difficult and the pleasant, as
the view discussed earlier [n. 28] claimed. In fact, the formal character of the object is entirely
the same whether any of these is added to one thing but not another, since ‘being excessive’
describes that by which, ‘being absent’ indicates the removal of the object, which is a

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33The critical edition omits tertio, but all the manuscripts except A and Y include it.
34See Anselm, *De casu diaboli* 12, 14; *De concordia* 3.11; Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d. 6 n. 49 and III d. 15 n. 66.
concomitant condition in both the efficient cause and the end, and not a formal character of the object, ‘willing for myself’ describes that for the sake of which, and ‘willing [to have it] on the basis of merits describes the manner in which, as was explained earlier [nn. 90–95].

[III. Objections]

112 There are a number of arguments against the view that desiring is an act of hope.

First: someone who despairs desires happiness (and the proof is that such a person is grieved by the loss of happiness); no one is grieved by losing something unless it is loved or desired; so someone who despairs desires and does not hope. Therefore, etc.

113 Moreover, I can love someone in himself through friendship-love and desire a good for him; but I do not love anything in itself unless I will good for it; therefore, if it is through charity that something intelligible is loved in itself, it is also through charity that good is desired for it. And35 a present and an absent good are desired by the same kind of desire, according to the authority of Augustine in the last chapter of De Trinitate IX.36 Therefore, desiring is not hoping.

114 Moreover, happiness is desired naturally, as is clear from St Augustine, De Trinitate XIII.5[.8]; therefore, no supernatural virtue is necessary for this.

115 Moreover, if hope is a virtue that inclines one to desire, then desiring – which is the act of this virtue – can be meritorious precisely because it is a theological virtue. But no act is meritorious unless it is elicited or commanded by charity. Therefore, desiring will either be elicited or commanded by charity. If it is elicited, I have established my point: hope turns out to be charity. If it is commanded, then at the same time that hope elicits, charity commands – and according to you both acts are acts of the will [n. 110], so it will turn out that the will has two acts simultaneously concerning the same object, which seems absurd.

35Reading etiam with SZNYQ for the edition’s igitur (‘So’).

36De Trinitate IX.12.18: “Although this desire – namely, inquiry – does not appear to be the same love by which what is known is loved . . . it is something of the same kind. . . . The same desire by which we eagerly pursue what we aim at knowing becomes the love of the thing known.”
[IV. Reply to the objections]

116 To the first objection [n. 112] I say that, as was explained in distinction 15 of this third Book, conditional willing is sufficient for grief if the thing willed does not come about or if the condition is not realized. Now someone who despairs wills happiness conditionally: that is, he desires to attain it if he can. And because his intellect mistakenly tells him that happiness is impossible for him to attain, he grieves. An example of this (as is discussed in that same passage) is someone who, with an absolute will, throws cargo overboard during a storm at sea. If he willed against it absolutely, he would not throw the cargo overboard, since no one is forcing him; nonetheless, there is in this case a conditional will not to throw it overboard (for he would will not to throw it overboard if that were possible) and so is grieved when he throws it overboard (for the condition on account of which he wills to throw it overboard is unqualifiedly not willed). Similarly, in the case at hand, someone who despairs desires happiness and wills that it be possible for himself; but in his intellect this condition, under which he wills happiness if it were possible, is presented as impossible. And therefore he is grieved by the opposite of that condition, which he wills against, and also by what follows from it.

117 As to the form of the argument, I say that someone who despairs desires happiness by way of a conditional desire, because he would will it if it were possible; but he does not desire it absolutely, because an absolute desire presupposes an intellectual conception that presents the desired thing as possible for the one desiring. For (according to Augustine, De Trinitate [XIII.7.10]) the will either does not will at all, or wills only in an attenuated way, whatever is presented to the will as impossible. Perhaps this is the sense in which what was discussed in Book II, d. 7, is true: the angel willed equality with God, not absolutely, since he grasped that this was impossible for him, but conditionally – and in that conditional will there is a sufficient basis for demerit or sin, just as there is a sufficient basis for merit [in the refusal to adopt that conditional will], and also (as our current discussion shows) a basis for joy and grief.

118 Therefore, some faith, acquired or infused, precedes an act of hope, inasmuch as only

37 Ordinatio III d. 15 n. 58.
38 Ordinatio II d. 6 nn. 9–13, 16.
what is presented as possible can be desired absolutely; and that possibility of attaining the
good is presented by faith, applied to a pleasant or desirable good. If it is presented as
impossible, then there is no absolute desire for it, but only a conditional desire: that is, one
would desire it if it were not apprehended as impossible. And a conditional desire of this sort is
not hope.39

119 To the second [n. 113] I say that just as the first object of charity is God as he is in
himself, because charity is the principle of tending toward God in himself, so too with respect to
all reflex acts it is the principle of tending toward God in some way, for the principle of a direct
act is the principle of all reflex acts tending toward the ultimate end under the same aspect.
Therefore, just as through charity I love God in himself, so too by reflecting on charity I love my
loving God. So no matter how many times I iterate the reflex act, I never have an object that is
good qua advantageous for me, but always something supernaturally and finally good as a
good in itself. And this is a perfectly meritorious act of desiring happiness, not as desiring it for
myself, but desiring it as a matter of perfectly loving God as he is in himself.40

120 So I concede that it is by the same act that I love some good and desire a good for what I
love. But the good that I desire for the one I love is not just any good, but an advantageous
good; [and the act by which I love someone and desire good for him] has as its principal
terminus the good that I love in itself out of charity. That is, what I desire for all whom I love is
that they love God for his own sake, that is, as good in himself, not as good for them.

121 To the third [n. 114] I say that happiness taken universally is desired through our
natural powers in virtue of the affection for the advantageous, because – according to Anselm,
De concordia 20 and 1941 – we cannot not will advantageous things. But happiness in particular

39The last two sentences of this paragraph follow the text of Q. There is no sense to be made of the
text of the critical edition: Sed ipsa apprehensio eius tamquam possibilis non est ‘desiderare’ absolutum, sed
tantum condicionatum, ut scilicet quantum in illo est, – quod tamen ‘desiderare’, si esset sine apprehensione tali et
esset condicionatum, non esset ‘sperare’.

40In the edition this sentence begins, “Now I will for myself that I love God as good in himself; and
this . . .” PNQ omit this clause.

41De concordia 3.13 and 12.
is not sufficiently conceived through our natural powers, but only with the addition of acquired hope – and even at that, it is not conceived altogether perfectly and sufficiently without infused hope and charity (much as was said about faith: assent to something on the basis of acquired faith is not altogether perfect apart from infused faith42).

122 To the fourth [n. 115] I concede that a meritoriously desiring will has two acts: one act of hoping, elicited by hope and commanded by charity, and another act elicited by charity. Moreover, in a case in which one act is subordinate to another, it is not problematic for there to be a plurality of acts at the same time in the same power. Quite the contrary: it may well be necessary that someone who knows a conclusion (when actually attending to it) must at the same time understand the principle, and that someone who loves, in an ordinate way, what is for the end by using it must at the same time enjoy the end.

[V. Replies to the arguments for the first approach]

123 To the arguments for the first approach, which appear to follow natural reason [n. 9], one can reply that in this case plurality is necessary.

124 In reply to the first proof [n. 10] it is clear from what has been said [n. 100] that desiring x for y, just by itself, cannot be an act of formally the same virtue to which that ordinate willing of the thing in itself belongs, although desiring x for y so that y will tend through x toward that thing as good in itself is an act of the same virtue [to which the willing of the thing itself belongs].

125 As for the additional point about acquired friendship [n. 11], it could be said that acquired friendship is a distinct habit.

126 To the further point about the certitude of hope of the certitude of the one who hopes [n. 12], I reply: that certitude precedes the act of hope and the act of despair. For no one efficaciously and absolute hopes or desires anything but what is possible for him to attain. And one who despair does not desire absolutely, the reason being that he does not believe that it is

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42Lectura III d. 23 nn. 48–51, 55.
possible for him to attain it, and so he is persuaded to believe, not to love, since the ultimate root of this error is not in the will (for the will’s not desiring it efficaciously is a result of the intellect’s not presenting it efficaciously as something to be desired).

127 On the same basis it is clear how to respond to the point about the universal and the particular [n. 19], because believing “I will in the end be saved” is just faith applied to a particular case, whereas desiring it is an act of hope.

128 But then an objection arises: then it will turn out that desiring a good of the same character for one’s neighbor is also act of hope; indeed (what is worse) willing a present good of the same character for Saint Peter will be an act of hope, which is absurd.

129 Look up the response.43

[VII. Replies to the initial arguments]

130 To the first initial argument [n. 2] I say that words are conventional. Consequently, ‘hope’ can be imposed, and in fact has been imposed,44 to signify a particular passion impressed on the sensory appetite by something desirable, present not in itself but in imagination – for if it were present in itself, it would be apt to impress pleasure, just as, on the other hand, a bad thing present in the imagination is apt to impress fear and a bad thing present in itself impresses sorrow. And I concede that hope in this sense is not a virtue, moral or theological. But that very same word can signify the aforementioned habit45 whose function is to incline to an act of the following sort46: desiring that the Infinite Good be a good for me, granted generously by God on the basis of merits that have or that I hope to have.

43Ordinatio III d. 31 nn. 19–20.
44Thomas Aquinas, De veritate q. 26 a. 5 in corp.
45The critical edition glosses “namely, the passion mentioned above,” which is so obviously wrong that I mention it here expressly so that I can make fun of it. Clearly Scotus is speaking of the habit of hope, which has been under discussion in this question.
46Reading talem actum with Q. The edition, following the other manuscripts, has tale objectum, “an object of the following sort.”
To the second [n. 3], although it is said\textsuperscript{47} that it is not an intermediate that shares in the extremes but rather one that unites them, it can nonetheless be conceded that a theological virtue is properly an intermediate, not in terms of the object, but in terms of the excess that can characterize an act. Now a moral virtue has to do with excess and deficiency not only in terms of the manner of action but also in terms of the act insofar as it tends toward the object. The latter does not apply to a theological virtue, since the object toward which it tends is infinite; but an act that tends toward this object can be immoderate (too much or too little), and virtue moderates the act so that it tends toward the object in an intermediate way. In this sense it can be conceded that faith is an intermediate between the shallowness of too easily assenting to what ought not be believed (as Scripture says, “one who is too quick to believe has a shallow mind”\textsuperscript{48}) and the obstinacy that is too resistant to things that ought to be believed, refusing to assent to anything unless it is proved by natural reason. In this way, too, someone can tend with too much love, or with too little love, toward an object worthy of love; but in tending toward God, it is not possible to tend toward too great a good or too great a truth. Now moral temperance requires an intermediate in both ways, since one can tend toward an excessive or deficient object and by an excessive or deficient act. The second way is common to moral and theological virtues; the first way is not.

The reply to the third [n. 4] is evident from what was said in the question on faith,\textsuperscript{49} and from what has been said in this question [n. 105]: it cannot be proved by natural reason that there is any infused virtue, because the acts – which we experience in ourselves – could be in us and be of the same character, and perhaps equally perfect, even if there were no infused virtue. But taking it on faith that there is such a thing as infused virtue, it is held that an act is not altogether perfect without it. So even if through acquired hope someone can hope for the things God has promised (as through acquired faith one can believe them), there is still an infused virtue that is by nature apt to perfect the higher portion of the will in desiring the Infinite Good

\textsuperscript{47}Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Sententia libri Ethicorum} II c. 10.

\textsuperscript{48}Ecclesiasticus 19:4.

\textsuperscript{49}Lectura III d. 23 nn. 48, 56-57.
for itself, and by that habit the will desires that Good more perfectly that it does without the
habit, just as it is held that there is a virtue infused by God that perfects the higher portion of
the will, by which one tends more perfectly toward that Good than one does without it.

133 To the fourth [n. 5] I say that the will has two affections, and it attains God immediately
in accordance with both of them: in accordance with the affection for justice through an act of
friendship by which it tends toward God immediately as good in himself, and also in
accordance with the affection for the advantageous through an act of desire by which it tends
toward God immediately as a good for the one desiring.50 Both acts can be well-ordered and
[both affections] can possess a habit that inclines them to that [well-ordered act] – a theological
habit, because it has God immediately as its object.51 This is not so in the case of the intellect, in
which there is only one power that is apt to have a second act that attains God, namely,
intelligence; and that power is sufficiently perfected by one habit that tends toward a truth to
which assent is to be given on account of revelation.

134 And on this basis it is clear what should be said in response to that objection about the
parts of the image [n. 6]. Even if there are two parts of the image in the intellect and only one in
the will, this is not because the intellect attains the object of the will through a twofold elicited
act. For although memory does have an act in the category of action, it does not have one in the
category of quality by which it attains its object; instead, only intelligence has an action in the
category of quality by which it attains its object: namely, its operation with regard to such an

50The text of this sentence after the colon follows Q. The critical edition reads as follows: “in
accordance with an elicited affection for justice, tending toward God immediately as good in himself, and
also in accordance with the affection for the advantageous or of desire, attaining God as good for me.”
This would be the only place in which Scotus ever speaks of an elicited affection for justice (and it is hard
to see what sense can be made of that idea) or of an affection of desire. Moreover, given the grammar,
‘tending’ has to modify ‘justice’ and ‘attaining’ has to modify ‘advantageous’ or ‘desire’ – syntax that is
baffling even by Scotus’s standards.

51Here the conjectural additions (in brackets) have no manuscript support. The first addition
reflects the fact that acts are not the subject of habits; the second reflects the point, made so frequently in
this question, that habits are settled inclinations to act in a particular way. The critical edition glosses ad
ipsum (which I understand as “to that [well-ordered act]”) as “to God,” which is a defensible reading,
though it seems redundant, given the rest of the sentence, and does not give precise expression to the role
habits.
object. Accordingly, in the intellect there is the character of a parent, to which belongs the action in the category of action, and of a product – in the Godhead these are the Father and the Son – whereas in the will there is no such character of originating naturally, but only freely. And insofar as it has the character of something that originates, the will can be held to concur with memory, as was said in Book One.52 I therefore say, briefly, that these habits do not correspond to the parts of image. Instead, they are simply two principles that can attain God immediately through elicited acts.: the intellect, which (as indistinct) attains God immediately by believing, and the will, as possessing the character of the affection for justice and affection for the advantageous, by loving and hoping.

[VII. Replies to the arguments for the third approach]

135 To the arguments for the view that locates charity in the concupiscible and hope in the irascible [n. 27]: One might perhaps concede the arguments offered to prove the distinction of the irascible and the concupiscible in the will [nn. 28–31] on the basis of their corresponding to distinct moral virtues perfecting the will [n. 39], but the distinction is not needed to answer the question at issue here.

136 But which of these two virtues is in the will as in its concupiscible power?

In keeping with how the view is put forward, the answer will be hope, taking ‘desire’ (concupiscere) strictly as “desiring (desiderare) something advantageous for the one desiring (concupiscenti). But absolutely speaking, both of these appetitive theological virtues are in the concupiscible, because the irascible is not apt to have God as its immediate object, as one argument against this opinion – the one about anger [n. 35] – discusses; and the point will be discussed later in the material on the moral virtues [d. 34, nn. 38, 48, 51].

52 Ordinatio I d. 2 nn. 300–303.